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THE DANGERS AND THE ANSWERS
The Coronavirus crisis has massively aggravated the 
existing systemic risks facing the international order. 
Prior to the crisis a powerful global tendency towards 
authoritarian governance already existed. Political 
nationalism has proven very amenable to the economic 
conditions created after the 2008 financial crisis. At 
the level of  domestic politics nationalism provides a 
vocabulary of  fear and diversion, directing grievances 
towards ‘aliens’ and other minorities within the polity 
and raising hostility towards imagined ‘foreign’ enemies 
outside it. At the international level it creates tensions 
between states, which, in the contemporary world, 
primarily concern economics. But there are still a host of  
examples of  territorial disputes animated by traditional 
territorial nationalism. Recent examples include the 
Russian annexation of  Crimea, the US proposed 
Israeli formal annexation of  most of  the Palestinian 
administered West Bank, the Chinese territorial claims 
over Taiwan and the denial of  self-determination for the 
people of  Kashmir. 
The crisis created by the virus is genuinely universal 
and global. Solutions to it require international 
cooperation. Unfortunately, there are good reasons to 
believe that the existing trend towards authoritarian 
government will continue in the post-virus world. In a 
world already beset with a dangerous rise in nationalism 
the Coronavirus crisis risks adding fuel to the fire. 
Shutting down the global economy has created the 
most serious peacetime economic crisis the world has 
ever seen. Even with unprecedented state interventions 
to support employment and prevent bankruptcy, 
unemployment is spiking rapidly. The public health 
element of  the crisis also compounds inequalities across 
the world. Britain and the United States are at the apex 
of  a category of  wealthy countries where state capacity 
has been weakened by decades of  marketisation exposing 
populations, and particularly BAME communities 
and other marginalised social groups, to much higher 
levels of  risk. Poorer countries without the same levels 
of  economic capacity are facing the crisis at a clear 
disadvantage, due less to bad political choices than 
structural inequalities. Globalisation, particularly the 
conditions attached to accessing credit and investment in 
the international financial system, expose poorer states to 
far greater risks in a pandemic situation. At the political 
level, the response to the crisis poses big questions for 
1  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-52651651 
human rights and the drift towards surveillance societies. 
The communications technology being used, or prepared, 
to monitor and contain the spread of  the virus has 
potentially serious privacy and surveillance implications. 
As ‘ground zero’ for the pandemic, China is at the 
centre of  the crisis. Its economic strength combined 
with its lack of  democracy also poses big questions for 
the future of  the world system. The country stands out 
globally as one of  a handful of  remaining communist 
party states, a legacy of  the failed project of  twentieth 
century social revolution. Unlike most of  the ‘new’ 
authoritarians, i.e. countries at various stages of  drift 
towards authoritarian governance, it openly opposes 
liberal democratic rights and freedoms. In Hong Kong, 
it has engaged in an on-going, violent conflict with 
pro-democracy protests and has now unilaterally imposed 
a national security law that dramatically curtails the 
polity’s freedoms under the ‘one country, two systems’ 
agreement. In its similarly restless Xinjiang province it has 
used Han Chinese ethnic nationalism to systematically 
repress the Uyghur population with a million people 
detained in ‘re-education’ camps designed to enforce 
changes in belief  system, cultural and religious identity, 
and politics. On the other hand, while western states 
have floundered in their response to the crisis, China 
has by contrast drawn on its extraordinary levels of  state 
capacity to make dramatic large scale interventions to 
successfully contain its spread. While it initially tried to 
cover up the outbreak, once it changed course the results 
were impressive. For example, when new cases reappeared 
in Wuhan following an easing of  the lockdown, the 
authorities set about testing all 11m residents within 
the space of  ten days (they didn’t meet the target but 
still managed over 6m1). This is a remarkable logistical 
accomplishment that underlines the capacity the state 
has to mobilise and apply social resources. No Western 
country has come close to matching such capabilities.
Reviewing the massive pressures that Covid-19 is 
storing up for the post-crisis world, the potential for 
Chinese ‘soft power’ interventions has clearly increased 
given its impressive response to the crisis. Indeed, looking 
to the future, the global authoritarian challenge is perhaps 
encapsulated by the figures of  Xi Jinping, the Chinese 
president, and Donald Trump in the United States. 
Under Xi the Chinese state has moved in an autocratic 
direction. He has cultivated a cult of  personality which 
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is summed up, totemically, by ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ 
being written into the communist party constitution in 
2019. China’s rise has become a bête noire for Trump who 
regularly engages in anti-Chinese rhetoric. Given that 
China is challenging a world system previously dominated 
by the United States, this is perhaps unsurprising. But the 
two countries are also major trading partners and have 
a very high level of  economic interdependence. China 
has financed the American public debt in exchange 
for running a large trade surplus in US-China trade. 
Trump, with his slogan of  ‘America first’, has launched 
an ongoing trade war, introducing tariffs on imports 
with a value of  $360 billion. He has threatened to 
go further still and also used diplomacy to try to lock 
Chinese firm Huawei out of  the global 5G mobile rollout. 
Trump symbolises the global decay of  democracy and 
the hollowing out of  its emancipatory ideal. China, by 
contrast, remains committed to its outright rejection of  
liberal democratic governance. 
The contrast between Trump and Xi is revealing in 
what it tells us about the state of  the global authoritarian 
threat. Trump is an authoritarian personality governing 
a liberal democratic system, albeit one full of  flaws. Xi 
shares some of  Trump’s preferences for ethnic nationalist 
discourses, most evident in the Xinjiang province, but in 
a completely different institutional context of  one-party 
rule. On the world stage, however, their approach could 
not be more different. Under Xi, Chinese foreign policy 
has promoted support for the continued existence of  
a multilateral global order that avoids a collapse in 
world trade. Chinese nationalism aggressively asserts its 
interests in relation to what it considers an East Asian 
sphere of  influence, but adopts a more moderate tone 
elsewhere. China has turned its economic strength into 
‘soft power’, notably with its ‘belt and road’ infrastructure 
investment initiative. While the incentives are clearly 
different for a ‘rising power’, China is not pursuing an 
‘America first’ style policy. It is more consistent in its 
strategic calculations than Donald Trump; and CCP 
policy appears much less disruptive and more inclined 
to the status quo. But in these very different ways they 
both encapsulate the ‘authoritarian temptation’ for 
global elites. China and the US form two faces of  the 
sovereignty-ist, strong state ethnic nationalism that risks 
becoming a new global ‘norm’. 
The world’s two most powerful states are joined 
in a roll call of  others experiencing a drift towards 
authoritarianism. Vladimir Putin has now been in power 
for two decades in Russia and shows no sign of  letting 
go; Narendra Modi in India has pursued an aggressive 
ethnic nationalist agenda on the sub-continent; Jair 
Bolsonaro in Brazil talks positively about the country’s 
historic dictatorship; and within Europe the far right has 
also made considerable gains, governing autocratically 
in Hungary and Poland and rising in electoral support 
in a host of  other states. Britain’s decision to leave the 
EU was also motivated, in part, by flag-waving jingoism. 
In short, prior to the Covid-19 pandemic many of  the 
most powerful states were moving in this direction. 
While there is considerable hope, and even expectation, 
that Coronavirus will bring about a system-change, 
the new global authoritarianism can also adapt to this 
changing context.   
We summarise these dangers as four threats. 
While there is considerable 
hope that Coronavirus 
will bring about a 
system-change, the new 
global authoritarianism 
can also adapt to this 
changing context
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1. ‘Deglobalisation’ takes a nationalist form 
‘Deglobalisation’ refers to a process of  uncoupling taking 
place in the global economy. Since the 2008 financial 
crisis regional markets have become more important 
than global ones. Financial flows between countries 
have never recovered to their pre 2008 levels.2 A range 
of  other indicators also suggests that deglobalisation is 
happening.3 Simply put, states (and regional blocs like the 
EU) are becoming less interdependent with the rest of  
the world. In other ways, however, the economic model 
has not changed. Pumping up asset bubbles with debt 
and speculation continue to be more important than ‘real 
world’ capital investment. Many Western countries have 
struggled with low productivity, low investment and low 
wages going into the crisis and show no signs of  reversing 
these trends since. Austerity was a disastrous economic 
experiment that compounded the problem because low 
private sector investment was not compensated for by 
a more active intervention by the state. As a policy its 
backers are now few and far between.  
An acceleration of  deglobalisation looks likely as we 
move forward. New technology is expected to incentivise 
‘onshoring’, i.e. developing more locally embedded 
production networks, and not ‘offshoring’ driven by lower 
labour costs. Tackling climate change will require more 
locally sourced, sustainable agriculture and a radically 
reorganised transport infrastructure. And the scale of  
state-investment required to deal with the Covid-19 crisis 
also illustrates the ongoing importance and primacy of  
nation states to tackling social and climate emergencies. 
These factors all create dynamics pushing towards 
greater deglobalisation. This could undoubtedly be 
managed in progressive ways with a new approach 
to global multilateralism. This would be a form of  
multilateralist deglobalisation: a managed retrenchment 
in international capital freedoms that restored greater 
democracy to states and regions. But given the global 
support for authoritarian regimes there is a danger 
that the form deglobalisation takes is politically and 
economically nationalist: throwing up barriers to the 
movement of  people, persecuting minorities and beggar-
thy-neighbour economic policies towards other states.  
2  Matthieu Bussière, Julia Schmidt, and Natacha Valla, ‘International Financial Flows in the New Normal: Key Patterns (and Why We Should Care)’, in International Macroeconomics in the 
Wake of  the Global Financial Crisis, ed. Laurent Ferrara, Ignacio Hernando, and Daniela Marconi, Financial and Monetary Policy Studies (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 
249–69.
3  Michael A. Witt, ‘De-Globalization: Theories, Predictions, and Opportunities for International Business Research’, Journal of  International Business Studies 50, no. 7 (1 September 2019): 
1053–77, doi:10.1057/s41267-019-00219-7.
4  Jose Javier Olivas-Osuna et al., ‘Understanding Brexit at a Local Level: Causes of  Discontent and Asymmetric Impacts’ (LSE CCS, 4 March 2019), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100204/.
5  On this see Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of  Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of  Power (London: Profile Books, 2019).
2. Less democratic participation,  
more centralisation 
The nation-state has demonstrated its importance in the 
Covid-19 crisis. This reflects a certain institutional reality 
in how politics works: it is embedded within particular 
locations with distinctive identities and citizenship 
regimes. But while perhaps ‘inevitable’ it is also full 
of  potential dangers. States like China that have been 
most effective in fighting the pandemic have mobilised 
resources centrally and planned their allocation with 
a very high level of  centralisation. Globally this need 
for emergency, war-like levels of  planning does risk 
normalising bureaucratisation and taking even more 
decisions out of  the reach of  citizens. 
The feeling of  ‘not being listened to’, i.e. a pervasive 
sense of  disempowerment, has been found to be an 
important indicator of  support for Brexit.4 Populist 
and authoritarian nationalism tends to feed off the 
perception of  an out of  touch, even corrupt, elite. But 
it is rarely associated with support for remedies that 
seek to decentralise decision making back down to local 
levels. Nationalism substitutes for greater substantive 
involvement in political decision making through the 
mobilisation of  identity politics. This has already become 
a norm of  political mobilisation in many states, cohering 
a form of  governance based on greater autocracy. There 
seems little reason to believe that a strategy, which has 
proven successful for those that use it, will not continue 
in the years ahead and requires a robust challenge by 
democratic forces. 
3. Surveillance state5 and erosion of  
human rights  
Covid-19 can be situated as part of  a package of  
‘organic’, i.e. genuine, threats to human security that 
are prone to instrumentalisation by forces hostile to 
the protection of  human rights. The internet and 
telecommunications revolution has created extraordinary 
avenues for ongoing monitoring of  human behaviour by 
states and private corporations alike. The cycle of  war 
and terrorism that has dominated international politics in 
this century has already led to a significant increase in the 
FOUR THREATS
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power of  the security and surveillance apparatus. These 
processes have already been normalised in states across 
the world. Securitisation carries particular implications 
for marginalised communities that already live with 
harassment and persecution by state authorities. 
The major danger going forward is that popular 
support for human rights still rests on weak foundations 
in society. While populations will often lack trust in public 
authorities (itself  a problem driving populist voting), 
this rarely translates into support for a human rights 
agenda that provides some protections for individuals 
and vulnerable groups from state coercion. The abuse 
of  powers assumed by the state in the exceptional 
circumstances of  fighting Covid-19 - and their subsequent 
normalisation - carries obvious dangers for protecting 
basic liberties, including freedom of  association, speech 
and privacy. The economic disruption of  the crisis and 
the accompanying debt burdens placed on states may lead 
to renewed austerity, further jeopardising economic and 
social human rights.  
4. Inequality goes unchallenged 
The convulsions of  capitalism we are living through are 
increasingly settling upon a particular political form: an 
authoritarian and kleptocratic state.6 Modern capitalist 
economies incentivise ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour through 
financialisation and speculation, rather than pursuing  
productive investment.7 This model has produced eye-
watering levels of  global inequality. Oxfam has shown 
that 2,153 billionaires have more wealth than 60 percent 
of  the planet’s population or 4.6 billion people.8 The 
economics that produces this inequality requires a 
high level of  capital mobility, allowing money to move 
effortlessly across borders, concentrating in low tax 
jurisdictions and with an accompanying legal global 
infrastructure to enable high levels of  financial secrecy. 
While the model arose through ‘the retreat of  the state’, 
in a celebration of  supposedly ‘free markets’, today it has 
necessitated ‘the advance of  the state’. The system of  
financial globalisation is now underwritten by the massive 
fiscal largesse of  states propping up this malfunctioning 
system.  
New authoritarians play a particular role in this 
context. They do not propose reforms to substantially 
6  Paul Mason, ‘Ellen Meiksins Wood Prize Lecture’, 22 March 2018, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/broadbent/pages/6854/attachments/original/1536175790/Paul_
Mason_Lecture.pdf.
7  Guy Standing, The Corruption of  Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay (London: Biteback Publishing, 2016).
8  Oxfam International, ‘Time to Care: Unpaid and Underpaid Care Work and the Global Inequality Crisis’ (London: Oxfam, January 2020).
alter the economic model. Their criticism of  globalisation 
is limited to its alleged embrace of  multiculturalism, 
cosmopolitanism and open borders. They also oppose the 
international cooperation needed to confront tax evasion 
and promote financial transparency. And in domestic 
politics, by turning attention away from economic 
inequalities towards the persecution of  the marginalised, 
they can play a helpful role in upholding the oligarchic 
global system.












In response to these threats we propose four alternatives, 
based on democracy and social justice. We can manage 
the profound changes underway in our economy and 
politics in ways that boost democratic participation. But 
to do that we have to confront the alternative: a much 
more authoritarian and kleptocratic capitalism. So we 
face a stark choice between a more social democratic, 
or socialist, approach rooted in the importance of  
democratic regulation of  public and private spheres, or 
a continuation on the current path where increasingly 
authoritarian states mobilise to protect private financial 
wealth: socialising losses on the whole of  society, while the 
profits stay private. 
1. Multilateralist deglobalisation 
Since the 1990s ‘alternative globalisation’ (‘altermondialism’) 
campaigns have advocated proposals for changing how 
globalisation works in ways that reject nationalism. 
Recognising that trade and production should be more 
locally and regionally embedded does not have to mean 
supporting nationalism. This agenda is about delivering 
greater social and environmental justice. In the two 
decades after the Second World War international 
cooperation successfully regulated cross border financial 
flows to prioritise productive investment and trade 
over financial speculation. We cannot ‘go back’ to 
this period, but we can update and develop some of  
the lessons. Technological developments such as the 
‘internet of  things’ (connecting physical infrastructure 
to communications technology to radically reduce 
production costs) and the need to invest in sustainable 
energy are likely to change the material incentives that 
exist in global trade and production. This may result in 
ongoing stagnation, or even reduction, in international 
trade. Multilateralism will be vitally important to ensure 
that this does not adversely affect poorer states. To deal 
with this we must ensure the benefits of  new technology 
are shared across the globe. So, amongst other things, 
globalising knowledge and democratising access to 
information should go alongside ‘deglobalising’ some 
production networks. And international regulation will 
be vital to protect the general interest, and prioritise it over 
the narrow, particularist interests of  wealthy states and 
individuals at the apex of  the new oligarchic model of  
financialisation. 
2.  Defend and extend democracy 
The rise of  China and the voluntary withdrawal of  
the US from the world stage under  a chaotic and 
incompetent President will create a strong gravitational 
pull towards an authoritarian bureaucratic model of  state 
power. The ostensible success of  authoritarian states like 
China in containing the virus should not lead to the false 
conclusion that democratic citizenship can be dispensed 
with in the interests of  decisive action. The success of  
democratic countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan and 
New Zealand, in managing the pandemic shows that 
sacrificing democracy on the altar of  public health is not 
necessary. If  anything, the opposite is true. The virus 
has likely taken a far worse toll than it might have done 
as a result of  China’s initial cover-up, which included 
silencing whistle-blowers and suppressing information 
on the nature and scale of  the virus. Had there been 
proper transparency, the virus might have been slowed in 
its tracks and other countries would have had more time 
to prepare. There is still no substitute for empowered 
democratic citizenship when it comes to the protection of  
basic interests. 
The challenge for democrats today is to contest 
the drive towards a permanent centralisation of  state 
power under the cover of  COVID19 and advocate for 
reforms that would redistribute power to citizens. In the 
UK, as we will set out, this means opposing the populist 
constitutional settlement proposed by Boris Johnson’s 
Conservative party in the context of  recent struggles over 
Brexit. Johnson’s planned reforms would enhance the 
discretionary powers of  the Prime Minister and weaken 
constitutional checks and balances – the very opposite 
of  the aspiration to “take back control” voiced in the 
referendum campaign. The reform process, as currently 
envisaged, is entirely elite-driven with no hint of  popular 
participation. In response, democrats should demand 
that any far-reaching constitutional reform should be 
put to a popular constitutional convention of  citizens. 
The convention should be representative of  the opinions 
and interests of  people from across the UK. It would be 
empowered to deliberate on what reforms to the political 
system are needed and make recommendations, without 
having its agenda pre-determined in the interests of  any 
one government or party. Only a popular convention 
process such as this can ensure democratic legitimacy. 
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3. Winning popular support for human rights 
The pandemic has revealed the central and overriding 
importance that populations across the world attach 
to at least one human right: the right to health. Both 
authoritarian and democratic governments have been 
compelled to shut down their economies to preserve the 
health and well-being of  their citizens (despite the fact 
the virus mostly kills the least “productive” sectors of  the 
population that some autocrats and neoliberals might 
prefer to dispense with). This was emphatically not the 
case with earlier pandemics, such as the H3N2 virus that 
swept the world in 1968. Apart from a small libertarian 
fringe, support for lockdown measures among the general 
public has been higher than many expected. Citizens and 
their governments have in the most part been willing to 
place the common good of  public health over the private 
liberties of  buying and selling that underpin the capitalist 
market place.
While the political and economic consequences of  the 
pandemic pose significant dangers for civil liberties and 
material well-being, there are also positive dynamics at 
work that can be built on. In addition to the importance 
of  a robust public healthcare system, the pandemic 
underlines the interdependence of  human rights and 
their universal character. It makes clear that the right to 
health cannot be meaningfully enjoyed in isolation, given 
that no one person is truly safe so long as others have the 
virus. This has been accompanied by the recognition that 
especially vulnerable populations, such as the homeless, 
prisoners and refugees cannot be abandoned to their 
fate in cramped and squalid conditions, with Spain even 
emptying out its immigration detention centres. We can 
now appreciate how the human right to health depends 
on the enjoyment of  other rights, such as the right to 
housing (offering a space to isolate); the right to food 
and welfare support (supporting isolation and a strong 
immune system); the right to an education (to follow 
public health advice and rebut conspiracy theories) and 
the right to a healthy environment (reducing the risk of  
cross-species contamination). 
Crucially, the crisis has also shown the vital role that 
the political rights of  democratic citizenship have to play 
in guaranteeing transparent and responsive government. 
This includes the right to trade union representation, 
which in the UK and elsewhere was vital to securing a 
furlough scheme that protects workers. The importance 
of  political rights provides additional grounds for 
opposing the introduction of  a permanent surveillance 
infrastructure under cover of  the pandemic. Such 
surveillance not only threatens rights to privacy, but also 
enhances the arbitrary power of  government to monitor 
opposition and even blackmail dissidents. Progressives 
today  must make the case for deepening, rather than 
diluting, human rights protections underpinned by a 
post-virus vision of  the interdependence and universality 
of  protections that can mobilise a broad-based coalition 
across civil society.  
4. A package of measures to fight inequality 
Covid-19 is not a ‘leveller’. The risk the virus poses to 
individuals and societies is hugely shaped by existing 
social and economic conditions. Economically the 
impact of  the shutdown is particularly asymmetrical. 
White collar office workers are more likely to be able 
to work from home. Meanwhile, blue collar jobs are hit 
hardest in both the exposure to the virus and the ensuing 
economic fallout. As we come out of  the crisis we face 
a perfect storm of  rising inequality, increased hardship 
and growing political nationalism and authoritarianism. 
To address this we have to promote a package of  
measures on a national and international level to tackle 
social inequality in all its forms. Doing this will require 
rebalancing the economy away from a model of  state-
underwritten private wealth generation. Instead we need 
a state-managed economy run for the public interest. The 
state will need to make investments in profitable assets 
to offset the liabilities accrued through the course of  the 
crisis. To address the explosion of  social hardship we are 
already seeing, measures such as universal basic services 
or universal basic income should be explored. Greater 
progressive taxation, coordinated internationally to 
tackle tax competition and combined with closing down 
tax havens and delivering tax transparency, can cohere 
support for an internationalist approach to rebuilding 
in the post-Covid world. Through these efforts we must 
demonstrate the superiority of  democratic governance, 
over authoritarianism, bringing about a set of  practical 
changes to greatly improve human wellbeing.  
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WHAT IS IT ? PICKING APART THE 
NEW AUTHORITARIANISM
The response to Covid-19: an eclectic mix?9 
There is no uniform pattern to how the new 
authoritarians have responded to the Covid-19 crisis. This 
reflects their relatively amorphous ideological nature. 
Indeed, a feature of  these forces, which is perhaps part 
of  their success, has been their eclectic ideological stance, 
allowing them to pivot between different postures in 
a rather flexible way. In their response to Coronavirus 
there are broadly two approaches: one group has pursued 
an authoritarian security response; another has instead 
favoured a response based on market egoism that asserts 
the primacy of  a perceived economic interest over and 
above all public health considerations. The authoritarian 
security camp has mobilised to close down democracy. 
Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Modi in India are both 
clear examples of  this tendency. They have taken 
draconian action to curtail political freedoms in the name 
of  fighting the virus. In Israel, prime minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu has similarly authorised sweeping surveillance 
powers to be used without oversight. In the Philippines, 
Rodrigo Duterte threatened martial law and instructed 
security services to ‘shoot dead’ those breaking the 
curfew. ‘Instead of  causing trouble, I’ll send you to the 
grave’ he was reported as saying in a statement consistent 
with his history of  using ‘law and order’ violence to 
curtail civil liberties under the pretext of  fighting the 
war on drugs.10 In contrast to this approach, others in 
the global authoritarian camp have taken a dismissive 
line on Covid-19. Trump and Bolsonaro draw on highly 
masculinised and egoistic discourses to pour scorn on the 
risks to human life and prioritise restarting the economy, 
above all else. The latter dismissals of  Covid-19, which 
draw on a register of  toxic masculinity in relation to the 
threat the virus represents to human life, are distinct from, 
but nonetheless compatible with, a broader conspiracy-
prone mindset amongst the alt-right media universe (see 
9  On this see, David Renton, ‘The New Authoritarians: Revisiting the Argument’, Lives; Running, 2 May 2020, https://livesrunning.wordpress.com/2020/05/02/the-new-authoritarian-
revisiting-the-argument/, see also David Renton, The New Authoritarians: Convergence on the Right (London: Pluto Press, 2019).
10  ‘Duterte Vows to “shoot Dead” Lockdown Violators as Unrest Grows in Philippines’, The Telegraph, 2 April 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/02/duterte-vows-
shoot-dead-lockdown-violators-unrest-grows-philippines/.
11  On this see David Renton, The New Authoritarians: Convergence on the Right (London: Pluto Press, 2019).
12  Zia Weise, ‘Berlusconi Wants EPP to Form Alliance with Far Right’, POLITICO, 10 May 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/silvio-berlusconi-epp-far-right-alliance/.
13  This taxonomy was developed out of  Shalini Randeria’s concluding remarks at the February 2019 workshop of  the LSE and IWM Visions of  Europe programme, Globalisation, Europe 
and the Democratic Crisis (LSE, London). The workshop was supported by the Independent Social Research Foundation Small Group Flexi Grant and the Open Society Foundation Initiative 
for Europe. 
Titus Molkenbur’s discussion of  Germany in this report). 
Drawing on existing anti-vaccine conspiracy movements, 
they present public health authority as a threat to the 
sanctity of  the individual and family. 
Defining the new authoritarianism: three  
key features 
Sadly we now have a large number of  case study 
examples across the world’s major continents to 
investigate the phenomena of  rising political nationalism 
and authoritarianism.  Until the last ten to fifteen years, 
the study of  far right movements in the post-war period 
has primarily concerned anti-establishment protest parties 
and street movements. Today, however, the new far right 
has coalesced into a governing force. The process of  
achieving this level of  weight in society has also involved 
a blurring of  distinctions between the traditional centre-
right and the far right.11 This has taken several forms: the 
creation of  coalition governments between centre and 
far right parties (as we have seen in Austria); the lurch 
of  traditionally conservative parties much further to the 
right (most starkly in the United States but also here in 
Britain); or some combination of  these (e.g. Bolsonaro 
and, to a much lesser degree, Modi, both rule with the 
support of  a number of  different parties). Prominent 
figures on the ‘right of  the centre-right’, such as Italy’s 
Silvio Berlusconi,12 have also talked openly of  striking a 
formal alliance with far right parties. Despite the great 
diversity found across these national terrains, we maintain 
that the new authoritarians have a strikingly similar set of  
ideological preferences and policy orientation across the 
globe. 
These similarities centre on three broad categories: (a) 
crony capitalism, (b) democratic erosion, and (c) ethnic 
nationalism and toxic masculinity.13 
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America: at the abyss?  
The killing of  George Floyd has led to a democratic 
uprising in the United States. Minneapolis police 
officer Derek Chauvin and three other officers now 
face criminal charges - a stage that in most cases of  
police killing of  African Americans is never reached. 
Protests and riots erupted across the United States. 
Taking place at a time of  pandemic, these events 
represent a huge reckoning for America and global 
society: a pivotal point in history where a number 
of  different trajectories are possible. The pandemic 
has already exposed the huge health inequalities of  
America’s system of  privatised healthcare, while the 
government response has been bungled by Trump. 
Deficiencies in the American bailout have also led to 
a huge spike in unemployment with 1 in 5 Americans 
now on the dole (end of  May 2020). Little wonder 
the American philosopher and activist Cornel 
West has described the country as a ‘failed social 
experiment’.14 
Trump’s reaction to the George Floyd protests 
represents a new and harrowing moment in the 
crisis of  American democracy. He has talked of  
mobilising the American federal army to restore ‘law 
and order’, a threat that led to the public rebuke by 
14  Cornel West, ‘A Boot Is Crushing the Neck of  American Democracy | Cornel West’, The Guardian, 1 June 2020, sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2020/jun/01/george-floyd-protests-cornel-west-american-democracy.
15  Barbara Starr, Ryan Browne, and Nicole Gaoette, ‘Pentagon Officials Express Concern as Trump Threatens to Use Military to “dominate” Protestors’, CNN, accessed 
4 June 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/01/politics/troops-deploying-washington-dc/index.html.
16  NBC News, Donald Trump Delivers Statement Amid George Floyd Protests | NBC News, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQFotIUg5MA.
his own Defence Secretary, Mark Esper. Pentagon 
officials are also reported to be opposed.15 He has 
glorified the violent police crackdown on protests, 
described them as perpetrated by ‘anarchists’ and 
‘domestic terrorists’, attacked governors for failing to 
mobilise the national guard, and presented himself  
as the ‘president of  law and order’ who will call on 
the military to ‘dominate the streets’.16 Crucially, this 
violent rhetoric was combined with a commitment to 
protect ‘second amendment rights’, i.e. to the right 
to ‘keep and bear arms’. The comments amounted 
to endorsing the armed, far right militias that have 
threatened black communities and protested the 
lockdown. 
This is a deep crisis of  American democracy. 
Backing domestic militia activity by far right groups 
is, in particular, a ‘genie out of  the bottle’ moment 
for the Republican party. The hostility of  even the 
neo-conservative elements of  the American defence 
establishment and ‘deep state’ to Trump provides a 
thin layer of  protection in this crisis, making it harder 
for him to mobilise the military for a full-scale armed 
crackdown on dissent. But this is certainly the most 
serious moment American democracy has faced in 












Crony capitalism and state-supported 
financialisation 
Crony capitalism refers to a situation where the 
relationship between officials and an economic elite 
dominates policy-making and the state is used in a 
corrupt fashion to favour supporters of  the ruling clique.17 
Crony capitalism may sound like it is counter-posed 
to free market liberalism.  Certainly supporters of  the 
latter have routinely justified rolling back the state with 
privatisation according to a discourse that identifies 
state intervention in the economy with corruption and 
nepotism. This myth is, however, no longer sustainable in 
a world economy where the process of  financialisation has 
been underwritten by huge levels of  state intervention. 
This was seen in the 2008 financial crisis but has reached 
an entirely new level with the state support needed 
in 2020. 
In any case, across the entire history of  
neoliberalism,18 the idea of  rolling back the state was a 
politically salient vocabulary, not a policy reality. Rather 
than withdrawing from society the state became much 
more attuned to the demands of  financial capital. This 
has created a rentier, not ‘free market’, system where state 
regulation, subsidies and taxation regimes are designed 
to allow capital, especially the digital giants with huge 
global reach, to maximise surpluses19 from the ongoing 
commodification of  human behaviour.20 Recognising that 
globalisation has created a structural system favouring 
rentier economics is crucial to understanding why the 
policy preferences of  the far right are gaining traction. 
For authoritarians, crony capitalism is an application 
of  their own belief  system to this economic structure. 
They seek to develop a national elite which is supposedly 
attuned to the interests of  the nation. The far right 
regimes in Hungary and Poland have been open about 
this as a goal of  policy-making: the creation of  a national 
economic ruling class that is not sullied with the alleged 
multiculturalism of  globalisation. This leads inevitably to 
corrupt relationships between the state and private sector. 
17  This definition is developed from Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, Political Consequences of  Crony Capitalism Inside Russia (Notre Dame, Ind: University of  Notre Dame Press, 2011), 2–3.
18  David Harvey, A Brief  History of  Neoliberalism, New Ed edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
19  Standing, The Corruption of  Capitalism.
20  Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of  Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of  Power (London: Profile Books, 2019).
21  Oliver Bullough, Moneyland: Why Thieves And Crooks Now Rule The World And How To Take It Back (London: Profile Books, 2018); Glenny, McMafia.
22  This is the term used by Ruth Wodak. See Ruth Wodak, The Politics of  Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, 2nd edition (London: Sage Publications Ltd, Forthcoming).
23  Balint Magyar and Balint Madlovics, ‘Hungary’s Mafia State Fights for Impunity’, Balkan Insight, 21 June 2019,  
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/21/hungarys-mafia-state-fights-for-impunity/.
24  Forbes Rich List, ‘Lorinc Meszaros’, Forbes, 9 March 2020, https://www.forbes.com/profile/lorinc-meszaros/.
25  Magyar and Madlovics, ‘Hungary’s Mafia State Fights for Impunity’.
26  Alberto Nardelli, ‘Revealed: The Explosive Secret Recording That Shows How Russia Tried To Funnel Millions To The “European Trump”’, BuzzFeed News, 10 July 2019,  
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertonardelli/salvini-russia-oil-deal-secret-recording.
Decades of  reform to the financial system then allows 
money to move across borders concealing this corruption. 
Indeed, a legal global infrastructure for money laundering 
and tax evasion exists to hide illegality.21 Kleptocratic 
rulers can readily draw on this system as and when 
required to consolidate and expand the ruling clique. 
As nationalists the far right also have an ideological 
opposition to the international cooperation needed to 
reign in financialisation, restore democratic oversight 
of  capital and close down the global infrastructure for 
money laundering.  
The new authoritarians have therefore pursued crony 
capitalism with varying levels of  shamelessness.22 Their 
support for a strong state that creates a private sector elite 
attuned to the interests of  the nation (represented by the 
party and leader) ideologically legitimises cronyism: 
Hungary. Orbán’s clique of  supporters receive 90 per 
cent of  the income from EU funded, systematically 
over-priced public tenders.23 Lorinc Meszaros, who ran 
a gas repair company in Viktor Orbán’s hometown, has 
become a billionaire as a result of  government contracts.24 
He received $170 million in dividend payments in 2018 
alone.25 
Italy. In 2019, a close aide to Matteo Salvini, the leader 
of  the far right Lega party who was at the time the 
Deputy Prime Minister of  Italy, held talks with three 
Russian businessmen to agree an oil deal that would 
involve illegally channeling tens of  millions of  euros to 
the far right party.26 
Austria. In 2019, the ‘Ibiza scandal’ broke out which saw 
Freedom Party leader Heinz-Christian Strache declare 
his intention to follow Orbán’s model in Hungary. In an 
undercover sting operation he agreed to the demands of  
a woman posing as a wealthy Russian investor. The fake 
deal would see her purchase the tabloid, Kronen Zeitung, 
and shift its editorial policy, in exchange for lucrative 
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Austrian government contracts. The crisis ended the 
participation of  the party in the Austrian coalition 
government.  
Democratic erosion: the assault on 
monitoring democracy
The new authoritarians have an ideological preference 
for a strong state with reduced civil liberties. These 
preferences draw on ‘law and order’ traditionalism and 
also connect in a reciprocal way with the crony capitalist 
orientation to constructing a ‘new elite’. A political 
preference for creating compliant public authorities 
attuned to the interests of  the party combines with a self-
interested desire to hide corrupt economic activity. This 
agenda has been pursued by an ideological attack on the 
constitutional or ‘rules-based’ element of  democracy. John 
Keane has referred to the construction of  independent 
public authorities that scrutinise the powers used by the 
state as ‘monitory democracy’.27 The term refers to how 
power has been used and monitored in post-war liberal 
democracies. A state that is transparent in its dealing 
with civil society and the private economy requires a 
capacity to regulate itself. Institutions, such as regulatory 
authorities independent of  government, as well as judicial 
review, are a mechanism for doing this. They provide an 
important ‘monitory’ check against the rise of  despotic 
politics. 
New authoritarians have radically challenged this 
system. By transforming the state into a vehicle for a 
ruling clique, they seek to dismantle the capacity of  the 
state for self-accountability. 
Hungary. Since coming to power in 2010 Orbán has 
systematically colonised the state with cronies, notably 
the Public Prosecutors Office, but also all spheres of  state 
regulation including education, culture, arts and sports.28 
He has turned the media into a mouthpiece of  the 
government, directly controlling the public broadcaster 
and showered government money on compliant pro-
27  John Keane, ‘Monitory Democracy? The Secret History of  Democracy since 1945’, in The Secret History of  Democracy since 1945, ed. Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell 
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 204–18.
28  Péter Krekó and Zsolt Enyedi, ‘Explaining Eastern Europe: Orbán’s Laboratory of  Illiberalism’, Journal of  Democracy 29, no. 3 (12 July 2018): 39–51.
29  January 27th et al., ‘How Will the Latest Judicial Reform Controversy Affect Poland’s Presidential Election?’, EUROPP, 27 January 2020,  
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/27/how-will-the-latest-judicial-reform-controversy-affect-polands-presidential-election/.
30  Piotr Buras, ‘Poland after the Election: New Headaches for the EU’, ECFR, 15 October 2019,  
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_poland_after_the_election_new_headaches_for_the_eu.
31  Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘“Slash and Burn” in the U.S. Congress and the Trump administration: permanent damage or short-term Setback?’, Revue francaise d’administration publique N° 
170, no. 2 (21 November 2019): 421–32.
32  Elizabeth Kolbert, ‘Suspending the Rules: How Congress Plans to Undermine Public Safety’, The New Yorker, 10 January 2017,  
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/suspending-the-rules-how-congress-plans-to-undermine-public-safety.
33  E.g. the Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of  2019 as discussed in Rose-Ackerman, ‘“Slash and Burn” in the U.S. Congress and the Trump administration’, 428.
regime private media outlets with government funding 
to run highly partisan ‘information campaigns’ against 
George Soros and the EU.
Poland. Under the cover of  the fight against enduring 
‘communist’ influences in the state, the Law and Justice 
party has waged an on-going campaign against the 
independence of  the judiciary.29 Like Orbán, Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski has also turned the public broadcaster into a 
mouthpiece of  the government and promised the ‘re-
polanisation’ of  the broader media, including government 
checks on journalists.30  
United States. While it has received little attention, 
perhaps overshadowed by the administration’s use of  
extreme racist and nationalist discourses, Trump has 
pursued policies in relation to public authority that also 
constitute an attack on monitory democracy. Republicans 
back ‘The Regulations from the Executive in Need 
of  Scrutiny (REINS) Act’, which would decimate the 
capacity of  independent regulatory authorities to uphold 
the public interest, favouring partisan and lobbying 
interests.31 Passed by the then Republican-controlled 
House of  Representatives in January 2017,32 it is currently 
seeking Senate approval. Trump has also declined to 
make thousands of  civil service appointments, leaving 
departments deliberately understaffed. Although this is 
motivated by neoliberal opposition to ‘big government’, 
the more radical Republican proposals in this area also 
massively increase the political control of  regulators by 
the executive.33
Ethnic nationalism and toxic masculinity 
The third category differs from the previous two. 
Democratic erosion and crony capitalism are both 
governing practices of  the new authoritarian right. 
But they are often not part of  their toolkit of  political 
messages that they use to mobilise support and construct 
legitimacy. In contrast, in this third category the new far 
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right focus on classical themes of  authoritarian populist 
mobilisation: perceived threats to the homogeneity of  
the nation, especially in relation to immigration; and the 
assertion of  ethnically inflected values structure based on 
religion, family values and heteronormativity, and usually 
also associated with a toxic masculinity typified by the 
attachment to ‘strong men’ party leaders.  
Italy. Salvini draws on imagery that promotes a 
toxic masculinity in tandem with violent opposition 
to immigration and humanitarian relief  efforts in the 
Mediterranean. His 2019 ‘beach party tour’ cultivated 
a highly sexualised image of  male bravado and 
machismo. This seems close to what Dibyesh Anand 
has called ‘porno-nationalism’, a form of  ideological 
movement whereby ‘sexualized’ images become central 
to ‘nationalism as an ideology and a lived collective 
political movement’ - a trait he also finds in Hindu 
nationalism in India.34 Alongside his well-known ethno-
nationalist attacks on mass immigration, Salvini has also 
combined this sexist imagery with an open attack on what 
he calls ‘gender ideology’, a catchall term for feminist, 
LGBT+ and reproductive rights movements.35 As such, 
it perpetuates a typical alignment of  nationalism with 
bigotry. 
India. Modi’s BJP party talk openly of  “Hindutva”, a 
definition of  India that explicitly excludes the country’s 
large Muslim minority. The normalisation of  violent 
rhetoric towards the country’s Muslim minority has gone 
hand in hand with territorial colonialism in the Muslim-
majority province of  Jammu and Kashmir (abolishing 
its autonomous status). A new citizenship law has been 
nominally presented as a pathway to citizenship for 
migrants of  other countries. But it excludes Muslims in 
what is widely seen as an attempt to disenfranchise Indian 
Muslims that lack formal documentation of  status.36 
Hungary. Islamophobia has similarly become a normal 
component of  European political discourse. Fascistic 
‘blood and soil’ rhetoric sits alongside violent discourses 
34  Dibyesh Anand, ‘“Porno-Nationalism” and the Male Subject’, in Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations, ed. Jane L. Parpart and Marysia Zalewski 
(London and New York: Zed Books, 2008), 163.
35  Sara Garbagnoli, ‘Matteo Salvini, Renaturalizing the Racial and Sexual Boundaries of  Democracy’, OpenDemocracy, 1 October 2018,  
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/matteo-salvini-renaturalizing-racial-and-sexual-boundaries-of-dem/.
36  Priyamvada Gopal, Zoe Williams, and Luke Cooper, Coronavirus Lockdown - Is Modi’s India Lurching towards Fascism?, Another Europe Podcast EP55, 2020,  
https://www.anothereurope.org/episode-55-coronavirus-lockdown-is-modis-india-lurching-towards-fascism/.
37  Viktor Orbán, ‘Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the Final Fidesz Election Campaign Event’, Website of  the Hungarian Government, 6 April 2018,  
http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-final-fidesz-election-campaign-event.
towards minorities in many states. Hungary is one 
example of  this broader phenomenon, which spreads 
across the whole of  Europe. Orbán’s final speech in the 
2018 election was nonetheless an extreme case. In coded 
terms he promoted the classical trope of  the Jewish 
conspiracy to flood the nation with non-white, Muslim 
immigrants. He spoke of  ‘the alchemical workshop of  
George Soros’ that ‘threatens the everyday security that 
we take for granted’ and leaves ‘women… in danger 
from violent attacks’.37 He linked this ‘struggle’ against 
immigration from the East in the present day to the defeat 
of  Ottoman rule in 1699 - an absurd, racist reference to 
the supposed ‘threat’ of  non-white rule.
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Bulgaria: ‘right wing discourse is the 
established normal’  
It is difficult to talk of  the rise of  the right in Bulgarian 
politics as anyone under the age of  30 will be hard-
pressed to remember anything else but the prevalence 
of  rightwing discourse. It is an established normal in 
Bulgaria’s political scene. 
Still, the current coalition between GERB (the party 
founded by Boiko Borisov, current prime minister and 
former mayor of  Sofia, firefighter and Todor Zhivkov’s 
bodyguard) and United Patriots (itself  an unstable 
coalition of  minority nationalist parties) has legitimised 
political movements that previously existed only on the 
fringes - and on local cable TV channels.
There is little evidence that United Patriots, or the 
parties that constitute it, have active grassroots support. 
There are, however, ample examples of  less coordinated 
but virulent hate groups tacitly endorsed by the Patriots. 
Among these are vigilante “refugee hunting” patrols on 
the south borders, as well as anti-LGBT “family rights” 
campaigners. Shamefully, on the left the old Bulgarian 
Socialist party is either silent on these developments, or 
is actively opposing equalities agenda policies, including 
the disputed ratification of  the Istanbul convention for the 
protection of  women and girls from all forms of  violence
In the absence of  grassroots political activity by the 
mainstream parties, fringe activism takes place. The hyper 
concentration of  young people in two to three urban 
centres has left the rest of  the country entirely bereft 
of  any sort of  progressive activity - either politically or 
culturally. There is a worrying revival of  the importance 
of  the Orthodox church, which is still aggressively 
homophobic and misogynist, but which speaks to people’s 
sense of  abandonment away from big cities. 
These long-term trends are unlikely to be significantly 
disrupted by Coronavirus. The Bulgarian government 
moved swiftly to contain the spread of  the Virus, allowing 
it to keep the total number of  cases to 2519 as of  the 
1st June and reopen the hospitality and tourism sectors. 
For the time being the government has consolidated its 
position. But it remains to be seen how the economic 
downturn now underway will shape the country’s political 
developments.
Alena Ivanova is a Bulgarian civil society activist living in London 
France: caught between the liberal centre and 
a consolidated far right?  
Rassemblement Nationale is now strongly anchored 
in the forefront of  French politics, and is probably 
the clearest electoral brand in the country given 
unprecedented political fragmentation, the collapse of  
the Parti Socialiste on the left and Les Republicans on 
the right, and the lack of  any consistent political party 
structure around Emannuel Macron. It is still difficult to 
imagine Marine Le Pen, or a successor, winning the 2022 
presidential elections, given that the bulwark of  French 
society remains deeply opposed to far-right populism and 
would likely vote for any other candidate at the second 
round. Nonetheless, a long-term process of  political 
realignment is potentially taking place, particularly since 
no left-wing party is currently able to channel and build 
on the social anger and frustration expressed in the gilet-
jaunes protests, or the pension reform protests. Macron 
himself  is attempting to change his electorate from a 
majority of  former socialist voters who supported him in 
2017 to a more centre-right coalition, leaving larger and 
larger parts of  the country feeling unrepresented. There 
are clear opportunities for the far right in this context. 
There are three main lessons to draw from the 
French experience. Firstly, a socialist party, which has 
enough depth, diversity and credibility to renew itself, is 
a precious thing, which is sorely missed in France today. 
Secondly, the whole of  French politics is diverging to 
the right in part because of  a lack of  European reform. 
Somewhat like Hollande before him, Macron staked his 
progressive promise on Eurozone reform, but this whole 
agenda has been stalled by intransigence from elites 
of  other European countries, which do not realise the 
damage they are doing to the core social foundation of  
the project. Thirdly, quality and critically oriented civic 
education, concerning the history of  French colonisation, 
religious diversity and the origins of  the different 
political parties and movements, is uneven across the 
French territory. Both formal education and non-formal 
education needs reinforcement particularly in the 
northernmost and the south-eastern parts of  the country 
where the vote for the Rassemblement Nationale is at 
its strongest. This unevenness in civic education is not 
a French specificity, but a problem that each European 
country faces.
Marine Le Pen is clearly already positioning herself  as 
the candidate challenger for Macron in the Presidential 
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elections in 2022, and there is reason to think such an 
alternative at the second round is the preferred match-up 
of  Macron as well. 
The strategy of  the Rassemblement Nationale is to 
be the only party in France criticising consistently and 
directly the government for lying and for grave errors, 
always with a suggestion of  a conspiracy of  the elites, at 
a time when other political parties (notably Mélenchon’s 
La France Insoumise) are more moderated in their 
criticism. The Rassemblement Nationale attempts to link 
the ‘laxism’ of  the state in dealing with the coronavirus 
to globalisation and Europeanism, and frequently 
makes (questionable) links between the ‘gilet jaunes’ 
and the people in the front line of  addressing the health 
emergency. Altogether the strategy is to attempt to lay the 
basis for social anger to translate into votes for the far-
right in the presidential elections.
Rather than address the Rassemblement Nationale 
directly, the government’s strategy in countering the 
far right in the coronavirus seems to have been more 
focused on ‘fake news’. The government launched a 
‘desinfox’ website which claimed to only carry reliable 
sources of  information from reputable media, but 
was quickly criticised for only carrying articles from 
Le Monde, Liberation, 20 minutes, France Info or 
AFP, and for barely featuring any articles critical of  
the government. The website was taken down after 
less than a week following widespread outcry amongst 
journalists. Altogether the exercise seems to have been 
counterproductive.
Niccolo Milanese lives in Paris and is the Director of  
European Alternatives
The whole of French 
politics is diverging 
to the right in part 
because of a lack of 
European reform
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Hungary: the first country in Europe to be 
‘truly captured’ 
Hungary is the first country in Europe to be truly 
captured by a far right, populist party. Relying on his 
supermajority in the Hungarian Parliament, Orbán 
began to curb the powers of  the liberal democratic 
institutions and to occupy them, as well as to concentrate 
vast powers in his own position. Within a year the 
Constitutional Court, the office of  the President of  
the Republic, and the Chief  Public Prosecutor’s office 
were filled with people with personal loyalty to the 
prime minister. Media laws were rewritten to give the 
government full control over public media. The one-
party-dominated legislature adopted a new Fundamental 
Law – and introduced a so-called ‘System of  National 
Cooperation’. The regime set out to centralise its control 
of  municipalities, the school system, academia and 
culture. By these critical changes, the political opposition 
has become paralysed, and civil society organisations are 
under threat of  official harassment. Hungarian society is 
struggling to come to terms with and resist a new form of  
political authoritarianism.
Hungary’s story of  the last decade reveals two 
important lessons and raises a fundamental question. 
First, the leading Fidesz party did not originate as a right 
wing party. Quite the opposite, it was once a centrist, 
liberal party of  the ‘89 generation that gradually turned 
to the right and to populist nationalism until it became 
an authoritarian force. This demonstrates that the threat 
of  the far right does not necessarily only come from the 
political fringes. But, lacking satisfactory checks and 
controls, it can easily be born in the centre. 
Second, Hungary’s case proved that the once 
unquestionable commitment to democracy in Europe 
has been waning. Neither European institutions, nor the 
complacent European political elite, were able to reflect 
sufficiently on what was happening in an EU member 
state; nor could they counter the populist nationalist turn 
that was fist visible in Hungary. Polarisation and anti-
democratic politics have been present in the West for 
a while. Yet, such phenomena were not perceived as a 
serious political problem until the year of  2016. 
The question moving forward is whether the West 
will accept the idea that some of  its countries want to 
be governed by a different set of  rules. It is an open 
question whether the European Union can continue to 
function, or even exist, if  its members do not share the 
same principles limiting the exercise of  power. In the 
response to Covid-19 the Hungarian government has 
been as extreme as it is dramatic. Orbàn granted himself  
the freedom to rule by decree, effectively closing down 
Hungarian democracy. He already had a large majority 
in the Parliament itself  and few constraints on his power. 
But he is using the Coronavirus to test what is possible. So 
far the response of  the EU has been muted - a worrying 
sign, clearly, for the future of  Europe.  
Zsuzsanna Szelényi is a Hungarian politician and currently 
Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow of  the Robert Bosch Academy










Germany: ‘the political landscape is 
changing rapidly’  
On 19th of  February 2020 a far-right extremist murdered 
nine people in two Shisha-Cafes in Hanau, and shook a 
vibrant multicultural community to its core. Right-wing 
extremists have killed at least 169 people in Germany 
between 1990 and 2017. But the response by Germany’s 
security apparatus has been insufficient. Right-wing 
extremists in Germany are well-organised, well-funded 
and well-connected with ties within the police, military, 
and secret service.
The right-wing extremist party AfD (Alternative for 
Germany), currently the largest opposition group in 
the German Bundestag, been described as the political 
arm of  right-wing terrorism in Germany. It serves as a 
focal point for the political ambitions of  these right-wing 
extremist forces.
On June 2nd, 2019, Walter Luebcke, a high-ranking 
public official of  the ruling Conservative party, was shot 
and killed. It was the first assassination of  a politician by a 
right-wing extremist since 1945. Recently, the president of  
the Central Council of  Jews in Germany, Josef  Schuster, 
said “If  there were coalitions with the AfD, I too would 
have to say: Now is the time to leave Germany”. 
In a famous lecture given in 1967, critical theorist 
Theodor W. Adorno discussed “Aspects of  the new 
right-wing radicalism”. In 2019 excerpts of  the lecture 
became an instant bestseller in Germany. For many, 
Adorno accurately describes the behaviour and tactics 
of  the AfD: “The far-right thrives on an unconscious 
desire for disaster. They hate democracy but pretend to 
be the only democratic party. Their beliefs and messages 
contradict objective reality. Today’s fake new is yesterday’s 
demagogy. The substance of  right-wing extremist politics 
is propaganda itself.”
German politics reflects the difficulties of  countering 
a party engulfed in paranoia that longs for the end of  
democracy. The frequently invoked cordon sanitaire around 
the AfD crumbles at an alarming rate – especially in 
the German East. The recent election of  Thomas 
Kemmerich in Thuringia with votes by the AfD meant a 
seismic shift in German politics.
Angela Merkel’s hand-picked successor within her 
own party, the CDU, failed at carving out a conservative 
agenda that keeps the AfD at bay. Conservative and 
liberal MPs now openly advocate for cooperation with the 
AfD. The centre is no longer holding. 
There are three factors that provide solace and lessons 
for those confronting authoritarian nationalism globally. 
Firstly, civil society is mobilising and adapting and new 
alliances are forming to oppose the far-right. Secondly, 
no one is above the law: the AfD is in trouble for 
engineering illegal campaign donations and former AfD 
leader Alexander Gauland lost his immunity and is being 
investigated for tax evasion. Thirdly, there are openings 
for progressive politics. The Greens, positioned as the 
anti-AfD alternative, have consolidated their ascent over 
the past year. They also have strong links with the Fridays 
for Future protests that continue to rock German politics.
In the corona crisis the authoritarian right and its 
parliamentary arm the AfD have failed to find a unified 
response to the crisis. The party was torn between the 
usual response: radical opposition to Merkel’s policies and 
the need to appear cooperative, as the electorate rallied 
around the governing parties.
With political and economic elites shifting the 
public debate towards reopening the economy, the AfD 
returned to traditional grounds attempting to replicate 
its strategy on the refugee crisis and the climate debate: 
accusing the government of  dictatorial behaviour, 
fostering xenophobia and presenting itself  as the only 
true representatives of  the German people. Its leaders 
hope that an inevitable economic downturn, higher 
unemployment and discontent will enable the party once 
again to position itself  as the sole mouthpiece of  the 
frustrated and disadvantaged.
However, the political landscape is changing rapidly. 
A new party, Resistance2020, has formed in an attempt 
to cohere a political movement out of  the loose coalition 
of  right-wingers, left-wingers, anti-vaxers, and conspiracy 
theorists who take to the streets in growing numbers. This 
movement is powered mainly by the alt-media: right-wing 
bloggers, conspiracy theorists, and right-wing news outlets 
that were previously natural allies to the AfD’s. Now 
these outlets for the first time differ significantly from the 
official AfD positions.
In the past the AfD has proven remarkably adept at 
fostering discontent and adapting its message to its base. 
It remains to be seen whether they can achieve similar 
results again.
Titus Molkenbur is a founding member of  humanitarian 
organisation Jugend Rettet, a member of  the ThinkTank30 and an 
associate researcher at the LSE CCS.
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WHERE DOES BRITAIN FIT IN?
The Conservative agenda and Covid-19: what 
should we expect? 
The combination of  the coronavirus crisis with Brexit 
means that Britain now faces a perilous double-pronged 
crisis with far-reaching implications for how the country 
is governed. Boris Johnson leads a right-wing populist 
government hostile to democratic restraints and human 
rights protections. The “Vote Leave” veterans at the 
upper echelons of  government are committed to a 
radical neoliberal restructuring of  society once the UK is 
extricated from the EU’s regime of  regulatory protections 
and standards. During the pandemic, Johnson has sought 
to project a unifying “One Nation” figure. Yet he is poor 
on policy detail and has struggled to present an image of  
effective - or even minimally competent - leadership.  His 
tried-and-tested routine of  breezy, flag-waving optimism 
jars with the reality of  a crisis that has left the UK with 
the second worst death toll in the world.
Like other populist politicians, Johnson thrives most 
in an atmosphere of  chaos and polarisation. This was 
fully on display in the run up to the Brexit deadline last 
autumn. Many were shocked by his illegal suspension of  
parliament, veiled threats to disobey the law and purging 
of  21 MPs from the moderate wing of  the Tory party. 
In the subsequent general election campaign, the Tories 
threatened broadcasters over unfavourable coverage, 
avoided critical scrutiny and spread disinformation 
through the media. As he gave his post-election victory 
speech, Johnson stood in front of  a large sign declaring 
that he would lead a “People’s Government”. In this 
approach, Johnson has been able to count on the critical 
support of  a solid swathe of  voters who have been 
mobilised by the Brexit culture war (see below). This is 
an ominous sign. As Milan Svolik convincingly argues, 
authoritarian backsliding occurs globally in a context of  
extreme polarisation where voters are willing to place 
partisan interests over the proper functioning of  the 
democratic process.38
Johnson’s government has deployed the same tactics 
of  media manipulation and deceit in responding to 
COVID19. We have seen inflated claims about levels of  
testing and PPE and the dodgy use of  statistics. Major 
announcements have been given to a small select pool of  
38  Milan W. Svolik, ‘Polarization versus Democracy’, Journal of  Democracy 30, no. 3 (10 July 2019): 20–32, doi:10.1353/jod.2019.0039.
39  “On the referendum #31: Project Maven, procurement, lollapalooza results & nuclear/AGI safety” Dominic Cummings, Dominic Cummings’s blog, 1 March, 2019 at:   
https://dominiccummings.com/tag/qian-xuesen/ 
40  David Pegg and Rob Evans, “ AI firm that worked with Vote Leave given new coronavirus contract”, The Guardian, 2 June, 2020, at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jun/02/ai-firm-that-worked-with-vote-leave-wins-new-coronavirus-contract 
lobby journalists, rather than the House of  Commons, 
while critical lines of  media questioning have been shut 
down. In early June, MP’s were forced back to London 
to cast their votes in person  after the Leader of  the 
House of  Commons, Jacob Rees-Mogg, abandoned 
a much safer and more practical system of  electronic 
voting. While on the one hand the long queues snaking 
around Westminster seemed ridiculous, the result was 
to effectively disenfranchise all those MP’s who were 
shielding because of  coronavirus. 
Most worrying of  all, the early failure of  the 
government to introduce lockdown measures in line with 
other countries reflects the same disregard for established 
expertise and sense of  national superiority that animates 
the Brexit project. Indeed, in an echo of  the macho 
neoliberal discourse of  Trump and Bolsonaro, Johnson’s 
early pronouncements referred to possible lockdown 
measures as “draconian” and even toyed with the idea 
of  taking the virus “on the chin” as it moved through 
the population. Ultimately, of  course, the sheer scale of  
the threat to human life led the British state to assume 
sweeping emergency powers. The Coronavirus Act 
2020 gives the state power to intrude into almost every 
aspect of  our lives. Many of  these powers are no doubt 
necessary to deal with the virus and mirror those adopted 
in other liberal democratic states, but in the UK their use 
is not restrained by the checks and balances of  a codified 
constitution.  
Of  particular concern is the development of  a large-
scale infrastructure for surveillance and data-gathering to 
deal with the pandemic under the apparent oversight of  
Dominic Cummings. The Prime Minister’s chief  advisor 
has previously expressed an interest in China’s totalitarian 
“social credit” system which monitors citizens and assigns 
them a single numeric score based on their behaviour, 
linked to incentives and sanctions.39  The AI firm Faculty 
- which worked on the Vote Leave campaign - has been 
handed UK government contracts to use personal data 
from across multiple domains as part of  the government’s 
response.40 A number of  leading Tories are said to have 
financial interests in Faculty, consistent with a pattern 
of  lucrative government contracts on coronavirus being 
awarded to companies with ties to the party.   
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Over the course of  the crisis, Johnson’s support has 
plummeted in opinion polls thanks to the high death toll 
and his refusal to sanction Cummings for his flagrant 
violation of  quarantine rules. Still, Johnson continues to 
enjoy a large 80 seat majority in parliament, along with 
the loyal backing of  his MPs and the right-wing press. 
And while the ongoing public health crisis currently 
consumes government attention, we should not assume 
that the Tories have abandoned their core commitments 
to the centralising political reform agenda spelled out in 
their 2019 election campaign. 
Reviewing the 2019 manifesto: dangers  
for democracy
The Tory manifesto suggests that Johnson and Cummings 
plan to mobilise the frustration of  Leave voters in 
pursuit of  a new populist constitutional settlement that 
will simultaneously centralise power in government 
hands and get even with those who have stood in the 
way of  their desired Brexit. The manifesto contains a 
chillingly vague promise to “look at the broader aspects 
of  our constitution”, squarely blaming Parliament for its 
“failure to deliver Brexit” and “thwarting the democratic 
decision of  the British people”. For many observers, 
the parliamentary deliberation and contestation which 
followed the referendum result were the signs of  robust 
constitutional democracy in action. For the Tories, 
channeling a large section of  angry voters, however, 
this was evidence of  “chaos” and “paralysis” that 
proves the need to rebalance power in favour of  the 
executive. When an ambitious populist leader proposes 
sweeping constitutional change to end the “chaos” of  
parliamentary procedure, it does not usually end well. 
Danger (a): Constitutional reform. There is a long-
standing critique that Britain’s already centralised political 
system - in which the executive controls a  sovereign 
parliament - functions as an “elective dictatorship”.41 It is 
possible for a government with a majority in Westminster 
to drive through sweeping constitutional change without 
the need to build consensual cross-party support, as is 
typically required in countries with codified constitutions. 
From what we know so far, a Constitution, Democracy 
and Rights Commission will oversee the government’s 
reform agenda under the leadership of  Michael Gove. 
41  Lord Hailsham  (1976) Elective dictatorship: The Listener, 21 October, pp. 496–500.
42  Tom Wilson and Richard Walton, “Extremism Rebellion”, Policy Exchange, July 16, 2019, at: https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/extremism-rebellion/
The Commission will examine the powers of  the courts to 
review government action (the central point of  contention 
in the two “Brexit” legal cases brought by Gina Miller). 
It is also likely to look at the use of  parliamentary 
powers that MPs (with the able assistance of  Speaker 
John Bercow) deployed to seize control of  the Commons 
agenda, demand information and pass legislation to 
compel government action during the struggles over 
Brexit. The clear intention is to restore discretionary 
power to the Prime Minister, including - through the 
repeal of  the Fixed Term Parliament Act - the power to 
hold elections at a time of  his choosing. It is less clear how 
the government will approach the question of  devolution 
and Scottish independence. In the face of  growing 
political and cultural divergences between the nations 
of  the UK - over both Brexit and the handling of  the 
coronavirus crisis - we may yet see a rear-guard action by 
the forces of  Tory unionism that attempts to erode and 
limit the powers of  the devolved governments.
Danger (b): Human rights. The manifesto also contains 
plans for a clampdown on human rights and the status of  
unpopular minorities, including the traveller community. 
It talks of  the need to “update” the Human Rights 
Act and administrative law to rebalance it in favour of  
“national security and effective government”. Though 
little detail is given, there is a long-standing view on the 
Tory right that government should not be restrained by 
courts when it comes to detaining terror suspects without 
trial, stripping people of  their citizenship and deporting 
people to countries that practice torture. According to 
the authoritarian nationalist perspective, rights are not 
universal entitlements, which protect the most vulnerable, 
but a privilege for the right sort of  British citizen which 
the government (not judges) should be free to define as it 
sees fit. 
Danger (c): Protest and participation. Weakened human 
rights law would also free the state’s hand to crackdown 
on protest. This is something that the think tank 
Policy Exchange (with its close links to Gove and other 
leading Tories) has been calling for in response to high-
profile disruptive actions by the environmental group, 
Extinction Rebellion.42 An undermining of  protest rights 
is consistent with other Tory commitments to criminalise 
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international trespass (affecting occupations and protests 
on private property), prohibit boycotts by public bodies 
and limit transport strikes. In an echo of  Republican 
voter suppression strategies in the US, the government 
also proposes to introduce voter ID laws in response to 
the (miniscule) problem of  voter fraud. This would have 
the effect of  preventing many young, poor and precarious 
voters (who traditionally support Labour) from casting 
their ballots. 
Danger (d): Anti-immigration agenda. The Tories will end 
the freedom of  movement of  people with the EU/EEA 
and replace it with a version of  the existing points based 
system for non-EU/EEA nationals. This is unfortunately 
an uncontentious part of  the current trade negotiations. 
Both the EU and UK accepted in the existing Withdrawal 
Agreement that freedom of  movement would end and 
now the Immigration Bill has passed its second reading 
in parliament. For EU nationals living in the UK the 
‘pre Settled’ and ‘Settled Status’ schemes is not the 
continuation of  rights they were promised and creates 
considerable uncertainty.43 With Priti Patel at the Home 
Office a hardline approach to immigration is likely to be a 
feature of  government policy in the years ahead.
These developments would be concerning at the best of  
times. At a time when Britain faces a series of  profound 
shocks to its economy and governance, with coronavirus 
and Brexit, the situation is deeply alarming. Britain has 
a relatively long-standing parliamentary democracy 
and the country successfully escaped the dark spells of  
dictatorship that befell many European states in the 20th 
century. Its political institutions are resilient and it has a 
lively, contestatory civil society with a critical constituency 
of  its citizens averse to authoritarian fear-mongering. 
At the same time, the country has failed to deal with its 
colonial past, is living with the huge social inequalities 
created by neoliberalism, and has deeply intolerant right 
wing media. The path ahead is a turbulent one and there 
is nothing intrinsic to the UK’s politics that makes it 
immune from the kind of  authoritarian backsliding we 
have witnessed elsewhere.  
43  See https://www.righttostay.org.uk/ 
44  Source for graph: https://twitter.com/p_surridge/status/1235903843143213058?s=20 
Where are the British Tories going? 
It might be hoped that the scale of  the challenge posed by 
the Covid-19 crisis, and the urgent need for international 
cooperation, leads the Tories to move away from some 
of  the policies that they successfully popularised in the 
2019 General Election. While we would like this to be 
true, since the Brexit referendum the Conservatives have 
moved in a more authoritarian direction and reaped 
an electoral benefit from it. The British Election Study 
distinguishes between the traditional left versus right scale 
(defined by attitudes to the economy and distribution of  
wealth) and the values divide comprising what they refer 
to as a conflict between authoritarian and liberal social 
values (defined by attitudes to issues such as law and order 
and minority rights). Crucially, the study shows how the 
Conservatives used Brexit to win a swathe of  voters that 
are ‘left wing’ in economic terms but also have socially 
conservative or ‘authoritarian’ values. 
As data from the 2019 British Election Study put 
together by Paula Surridge44 shows (see graph, next page), 
Labour lost many ‘authoritarian - left wing’ voters to the 
Conservatives this time around.
This suggests the Conservatives have a strong electoral 
case for continuing to go in the direction we describe 
above. Given that many in the party leadership are 
also ideologically committed to this direction, it would 
be naive to believe that, faced with the current crisis, 
they will not interpret it along the lines of  their existing 
roadmap for Brexit Britain. They will, however, be 
electorally vulnerable to criticism from opposition parties 
on the economy and any issue raising social inequalities. 
If  the ‘left wing’ Conservative vote judges that they are 
failing to uphold the interests of  working classes in the 
crisis, it seems possible that they may switch back to 
Labour.
This is not an argument for conceding, however, to 
their authoritarian agenda. On the contrary, a robust, 
democratic resistance is needed. For figures such as 
Dominic Cummings, Brexit is part of  a broader agenda 
to move Britain towards a model of  political and 
economic development that combines considerable 
investment in infrastructure and technology with an 
authoritarian, nationalistic politics based on a strong, 
data-savvy state. The economic and social agenda 
has strong resemblances to the new authoritarians 
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internationally. It mixes deregulatory policies, such as 
support for so-called ‘free ports’ (islands of  low zero 
tax and regulation), with Keynesian economic policies, 
such as increased state investment in infrastructure and 
services. 
Many people fear that the government will use the 
chaos of  ending the transitional period without signing a 
new trade deal with the EU to pursue this agenda. Given 
the huge and immediate economic costs this would entail 
for an already battered economy, we do not consider a ‘no 
trade deal’ 2021 to be likely. The outlines of  a deal could 
involve staying in the single market for goods, but ending 
free movement, while continuing to talk about other 
issues. 
Crucially, whatever happens with Brexit it is vital we 
resist the political agenda underlying it. The crisis in 
the United States provides a clear warning to Britain of  
where authoritarian nationalism can lead. It is not too late 
to change course.
